of the Buddha's Teachings
Brahmanism and Sramanism
major philosophical traditions before the rise of Buddhism can
be classified into two major traditions, Brahmanism and 'Srama.nism.
They again can be categorised into the following schools of
thought: Brahmanism, Materialism, Aajiivikism, Atomism, Jainism
and Scepticism. The last five which are grouped under the Sramanic
tradition are opposed to that of the first. Brahmanism, the
orthodox (aastika) school of thought, based its metaphysical
theories on the Vedas as the final authority in all matters.
Materialism, Aajiivikism, Atomism, Jainism and Scepticism, the
heterodoxy schools of thought (nastikas), opposed to
the orthodox Brahmanical system and its Vedas. In searching
for, as well as, establishing a new socially human moralism,
the Buddha had renounced all these metaphysical doctrines prevailed
before and at his time. The Brahmanical doctrines of the self
(aatman) and ultimate reality (brahman), the hedonistic
materialism of the Cavarka, the Aajiivika theory of inherent
nature (svabhaava), the Jaina theory of action (kiriyavaada)
and absolute scepticism of Sa~njaya are rejected by the Buddha
on the ground that they do not conduce to moralism and final
Distinction of Buddhism from Brahmanism
Buddhism, as a new philosophical way of life, emerges as a counter-movement
against ethical and metaphysical doctrines of Brahmanism. Buddhism
being a naastika completely rejects the authority of
the Vedas and disproving the Brahmaa as the lord of all
creatures. This epistemologically entails denouncing the practice
of sacrifice as nonsensical and immoral in terms of ethics.
According to the Buddha, the Brahmanical claim that the Vedas,
created by Brahmaa for protection of the moral law, are Sruti,
 divine revelations and the final authority each
in every thing is untenable. The Buddha has indirectly rejected
this claim arguing that if no teachers of the Vedic tradition
have had vision of Brahmaa, the so-called creator of the Vedas
and this universe, the talk of Brahmaa is a blind talk, just
as when a string of blind men clinging to one another, neither
can the foremost see, nor can the middle see, nor can the hindmost
see. In the Caanki Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaaya
 the Buddha again refutes the authority of the Vedas,
the ancient scriptural statements (poraa.nam mantapadam)
as true while others are false, saying that because no braahma.nas
so far have attained personally direct knowledge of the truth
of their statement, such a claim on authority of the Vedas
as truth is just a groundless faith with no substance whatsoever
(ghoso yeva kho eso lokasmii), or a blind tradition (andhave.nu).
The Buddha goes further rejecting the claim declaring that this
falsity is not merely based on faith (payiruupaasanti)
but also based on the other four grounds, viz., inclination,
report, consideration of reasons and reflection on and approval
of an opinion.
The Buddha also rejects the cosmological theories of Braahmanism.
If Brahmaa in the Vedas is considered as the omniscient,
omnipresent, eternal, infinite and ultimate reality, or being
regarded as a mere appearance, a name-and-form, which is
one, non-dual, undifferentiated, non-temporal, non-spatial,
non-causal, beginningless, endless, ungrounded, essenceless,
transcendental, invisible, imperceptible, indefinable, incomprehensive
and unknowable he is substituted with the law of dependent
origination (Pa.ticcasamuppaada // pratiitayasamupaada)
by the Buddha. In its general formula "so this being,
that becomes; from the arising of this that arises; this not
being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases,"
this law explains that all phenomena and everything in this
world are both conditioned (paticcasamuppanna// pratiityasamutpanna)
and conditioning (pa.ticcasamuppaada // pratityasamutpaada);
they are, therefore, relative and interdependent without the
first uncaused causer, i.e. Brahmaa. Being endowed with mutually
arising characteristics, this doctrine opposes theories of past
determinism  (pubbekatahetu), of theistic determinism
(issara-nimmaana hetu) and of non-causation and non-condition
(ahetu-apaccaya-vaada). From this doctrine the characteristics
of existence can be understood as the causally natural law:
"Whether there be or not an appearance of a Tathaagata,
this causal law of nature, this orderly fixing of things
prevails, namely, all phenomena are impermanent, misery
and unsubstantial. The principle of dependent origination
(paticcasamuppaada) is called the middle doctrine
(majjhena dha"mma"m deseti) because it
avoids the extremely biased theories, as mentioned above.
The Brahmanical theory of self (aatman) as the central
theme expounded in the Upani.sads is also refuted. The
so-called aatman is in fact only the physico-psychological
combination of the five aggregates or groups (pa~ncakkhandha),
viz., the body-group (ruupakkhandha), the feeling-group
(vedanaakkhandha), the perception-group (sa~n~naakkhandha),
the activities-group (samkhaakkhandha), and the consciousness-group
(vi~n~naanakkhandha). These five aggregates (pa~ncakkhandha)
are all compounded and all conditioned. Being so, they are all
impermanent and all constantly changing. That is to say, they
are of dependently arising and passing away, so that there is
nothing in the nature of a stable, persisting and eternal entity
to be found in them. "Whatever is impermanent is suffering,
is no-self." This fact of fivefold combination of a
personality is "true, not false an unalterable."
The Buddha emphasized that the aatman is like a mountain
stream, which flows fast and is forever changing. There
is no being (sat), there is only becoming (bhava)
in it. The arising (uppaada), disappearance (vyaya)
and changing of what exists (a~n~natatha) are the three
signs of compounded things. The belief in a permanent soul
(aatman) not only negates the activities of moral life
but also falls in a form of grasping, a hindrance to spiritual
The fourfold caste society of Brahmanism, mistakenly based on
the concept of Brahmaa as the creator of the universe, is completely
denounced by the Buddha. According to the Buddha any claim of
superiority of Braahman-class over the other classes is untenably
social bias for getting economic privilege and gain. Such an
inequality of Brahmanism is strongly attacked by the Buddha
on the following grounds. Biologically, man is of one species
 and therefore any claim on the divine origin is refuted.
Ethically, all human beings are equal by birth, sex and race.
Only their moral conduct, which is directed by the intention
or choice (cetanaa), makes them noble or ignoble, exacted
or low. According to this moral principle, mans activities
and tendencies make him a farmer (who cultivates the land),
a craftsman (who produces utensils and instruments), a servant
(who serves others for a living), a thief (who takes to stealing),
a soldier (who serves in the army), a teacher (who learns and
imparts knowledge to others), a king (who rules a country),
a minister (who helps the king in governing the country). In
short, one is a ruler (khattiya), a priest(braahma.na),
a businessman (vessa) or a servant (sudda)
is due to ones moral behaviour and actual activities.
By birth one is not a braahma.na or an out-caste (vasala).
It is his activities that make him so. The Brahmans
claim for being superior in society is criticised by the Buddha,
who proves that all braahma.nas are in fact womb-born
of bramin women in the natural way, not of the mouth
of the Brahmaa, the Creator.
The soteriological theory of Brahmanism, as presented in the
Vedas and the Upani.sad, through purificatory
bathing, sacrifices as well as practice of severe asceticism
 is rejected by the Buddha. The Buddha clearly teaches that
neither purificatory bathing nor self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga)
 can bring about heavenly existence (sagga), purity
(suddhi) or emancipation (vimutti). Bathing oneself
in the water of the so-called sacred rivers as believed of capable
of washing away sins and moral evils in the Vedas is
regarded as foolish act in Buddhism. The classic example of
the Buddhist argument against this is that if the water had
such divinely purificatory powers, the aquatic shatters such
as fishes, frogs, tortoises, crocodiles, water-snakes etc.,
would have become saint or would have reborn in the heaven,
for their constant being in such waters. Disproving the
possibility of washing away sins from bathing in the holy waters,
the Buddha reads a new meaning into the existing rite introducing
of bathing without waters, such as bathing in the Noble Eightfold
path. Such bathing is capable of conducting to liberation.
Ritualism, ceremonialism and sacrifices (ya~n~na//yaj~na)
 are the most prominent features of Brahmanism as reflected
in the .Rgveda and the Brahma.nas. These are most
important part of Brahmanical religion. They govern condition
of human as well as animals. "Thing animate or inanimate
are all under the magical spell of ceremony. Gods, men, living
beings, lifeless things can all be equally moved through the
power of prayer or sacrifice." Their existence was
for the sake of the ceremony. The practice of human sacrifice
was also found in the Brahma.nas. A Brahma.na named 'Sunah'sepa
about to be sacrificed in lieu of the son of a king was saved.
In the another passage of the Braahma.nas I. 8, this
kind of immoral practice is mentioned in detail. The gods killed
a man for their victim. But form him thus killed the part, which
was fit for a sacrifice went out and entered a horse. Thence
the horse became an animal for being sacrificed. The gods the
killed the horse, but for the part fir for being sacrificed
went out of it and entered an ox. The gods the killed the ox
. . . sheep, goal etc. The sacrificial part remained for the
longest time in the goat, thence it became pre-eminently fit
for being sacrificed. Such bloody sacrifices were considered
to be necessary to propitiate gods. In the Pali texts 
five kinds of bloody sacrifices are frequently referred, viz.,
horse-sacrifice, human-sacrifice, peg-thrown site sacrifice,
drinking of victory or strength, and the bolts-withdrawn sacrifice
or universal sacrifice. In the Discourse of the Wrong
Sacrifice and the Right (Kutadanta Sutta) of the
Diigha Nikaaya  these immoral Brahmanical sacrifices
with its three modes and its accessories of sixteen kinds 
are strongly criticized by the Buddha, who introduces new kinds
of sacrifice, which is not bloodshed, less difficulty and trouble,
but bringing greater fruit and advantage in this life and hereafter.
These consist of (i) offering to moral sangha including
individuals of high moral, (ii) putting up of a dwelling place
(vihaara) on behalf of the sangha in all the four
direction, (iii) taking refuge in the Buddha, his dhamma
and his sangha; (iv) observing the five moral principles,
namely, abstinence from destroying life, from taking what is
not given, from sexual misconduct, from telling lies and from
drinking alcohol, (v) observing the minor morality, (vi) developing
confidence, (vii) controlling the five senses, (viii) cultivating
mindfulness, (ix) Living in content and solitude, (x) cutting
off five hindrances and cultivating the four jhaanas. Thus,
the amoral ceremonialism and sacrificism of Brahamnism is contrastedly
substituted with the socially human moralism of Buddhism, such
as love, sympathy, liberality and humanity etc.
The Pali texts refer a variety of asceticism, such as bovine
ascetics (go-vatika) undertaking cow-practice (go-vata)
putting a horn on their head and tying a tail and doing everything
done by cows, and canine ascetics (kukkuravatika) undertaking
the dog-practice, by dogs. In denouncing these useless practices,
the Buddha points out their cause and the motive as ignorance
and desired of attention and fame. So far as its consequence
is concerned, the Buddha pointed out that, these practices,
despite of torturing the ascetic, with no profitable state and
realisation of vision and knowledge, would lead them to
rebirth in animal world (niraya). Asceticism is not
the means of escaping the saasaara. It is low, vulgar,
base, ignoble and not conductive to good (hiina, gaama, pothujjanika,
anariya, anattasaahita). The Buddha categorises two kinds
of austerities: one torments the self (attantapa), torments
others (parantapa), and torments both self and others
(attantapo ca parantapo ca), and the other is one that
does not torture the body, but self-discipline, the discipline
of the five senses, that is the practice of the Noble Eightfold
Path, leading the practitioner to his final liberation. Among
the two, the Buddha recommends the latter and considers it as
the basis of the life of chastity and fundamental ascetic virtue
Distinction of Buddhism from Sramanism
stated earlier that being emerged in the history of Indian thought
as a new doctrine and practice, Buddhism is naturally different
from and opposed to those of old as well as contemporary systems,
such as the six heretical traditions. So many references are
found in the Pali canon showing the Buddhas attitude,
analysis and criticism of his six contemporary heretical teachers
and their doctrines. The model of reference to the six heretical
teachers in the Pali canon is frequently referred to as a group
 for general purpose, and causally with a particular heretic
 for a specific purpose of critique, though there is no
evidence that the Buddha ever met with any of them face to face.
Sometimes, the names of these theory founders are mentioned
in full and sometimes their names are not given. It should
be noted here that there is the case in which some confusion
is occurred in identifying the names of these heretics and their
teachings. There is a case, due to the complexity of their
perspective theories, some theory referred to them without mentioning
their perspective names becomes difficult to identify. In
most the cases, the criticisms of the heretics appeared in the
Tipi.taka are frequently made by the Buddha, sometimes
by his disciples.
his historical visit to the Buddha, King Ajaatasattu says that
he has previously paid visits to the six heretical teachers,
whose doctrines are logically dissatisfied and ethically puzzled
as recounted by him in the Saama~n~naphala Sutta 
of the Diigha Nikaaya. These doctrines can be briefly
summed up as follows: (i) Puura.na Kassapa propounded the doctrine
of amoralist causation or inefficacy of action (akiriyavaada)
denying the intentional actions capable of bearing fruits. That
is to say, for him, there is no merit of doing good and no demerit
of doing evil, and as a consequences this contention leads to
the rejection of the validity of moral distinctions and responsibility;
(ii) Makkhali Gosaala denying the causes of things (ahetuvaada)
and maintaining human intention and effort as powerless, advocated
determinism or fatalism (niyati) of six classes of beings
saying that self-purification or final emancipation could only
be achievable through a fatally fixed course in transmigration
(sa"msaara); (iii) Ajita Kesakambalin uphold the
materialistic annihilationism (ucchedavaada/di.t.thi),
which identifies the psycho-physical person (naama-ruupa)
with the body (ruupa), rejecting human effort and the
world hereafter (para loka). When the body is dead, it
entails the total annihilation of the psycho-physical person,
without the continuity of the consciousness for bearing moral
retribution of his deeds done; (iv) Pakudha Kaccaayana believed
in atomism of the seven eternal uncreated and noncreative substances
denying psycho-ethical phenomena among with the concept of psycho-physical
person. This thus entails the rejection of moral behaviour of
human beings by saying that there is no crime in killing a person;
(v) Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta advocates the theory of past determination
(pubbekatahetu) maintaining that freedom from bonds is
possible through practice of severe austerity or self-torture
and observing fourfold restraint (caatuyaamasa"mvara)
in four directions; (vi) Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta, an ignorant
skeptic, refuted to answer, positively or negatively or both
or neither, any doctrine or statement, including moral distinctions
and responsibility of human beings, put to him in question.
In this connection, Bhikkhu Bodhi has rightly pointed out: "In
the Brahmajaala Sutta, his position is included among
the "endless equivocators" or "eel-wrigglers"
who are incapable of taking a definite stance on the vital philosophical
questions of the day." The ethical theories of six
heretical teachers can be grouped under four main categories,
namely, materialism (Caaraaka), naturalism (Aajiivikism),
Jainism and scepticism.
The Materialists are known by different names: the Caarvaakas,
the Lokaayatikas or the Baarhaspatyas. Ajita Kesakambali,
Puura.na Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccaayana are known as the Materialists
of Ancient India. Believing in natural phenomena (svabhaava),
they advocate the ultimately eternal reality of matter reducing
all phenomena to four (according to Ajita Kesakambali), or seven
constituents (according to Pakudha Kaccaayana) namely, earth,
water, fire, air, happiness, suffering and life principle
(jiva). Materialism does not believe in the continuity
of human existence after death. This logically follows the denying
of moral retribution (kamma//karma), which leads to moral
nihilism (natthikavaada). The Buddha therefore, regards
the materialists as nihilistically amoralists (natthikavaadin).
Aajiivikism, like Materialism, is a school of Naturalists. The
well-known founder of this school is Makkhali Gosaala. They
believe in the ultimate reality of matter, on one hand, and
admit the continuity of human existence after death, on the
other. Thus, they differ from Materialists from the charge of
nihilism. The naturalist philosophy of Aajiivikism is covered
in three important concepts, viz., fate (niyati) species
(sa"ngati) and inherent nature (bhaava, svabhaava).
Fate (niyati) is the principle of coming into existence.
Species (sa"ngati) determines species of a being
as a human or an animal. And inherent nature (bhaava, svabhaava)
determines characteristics and nature of that being. The major
Buddhist rejection of Aajiivikism is on the ground that the
latter does not believe in human effort on the part of individual.
The Aajiivikisms rejection of human effort, thus, entails
the denial of the freedom of will. Following this, purification
is impossible by ones own transformation but through the
fixed cycles of existence (saasaara-suddhi). Thus it
falls into the form of past-determination (pubbekatahetuvaada),
a determined theory against moralism through human effort in
the present, and of the theory of external causation (para
Jainism as systematised by Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta, the Mahaaviira,
is different from Buddhism in terms of epistemology  and
ethics. So far as ethics is concerned, Mahaaviira seems ignore
the emphasis on the importance of psychological motive (cetanaa)
of the moral action (karma/kiriya), as uniquely does
the Buddha. For Mahaaviira, bodily action performed with or
without ones intention will produce equal consequence.
Mahaaviira appears to believe in partially biological determination
and partial human action, when he says "things are partially
determined and partially undetermined" (niyayaaniyayaa
saataa). His ethical theory can be, thus, grouped under
past-determination (pubbekatahetuvaada), a deterministic
theory explaining every human experience is due to past action,
which is condemned by the Buddha as against human cultivation
of ethics. Another ground on which the Buddha rejects Mahaaviiras
theory of moral action (kiriyavaada) is the latters
advocating non-doing and expiating ones past actions by
extreme austerities or self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga)
 as a means to attain liberation, which is painful, ignoble
Absolute scepticism was known to India philosophy very early.
The founder of this school is known as Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta.
He is known as a theorist of endless equivocation or an equivocationist
(amraavikkhepavaadin). He is extremely skeptical
regarding any kinds of certainty or human knowledge. He escapes
from both negative and positive statements asserting no thesis
of his own, even the thesis of what is good (kusala)
and evil (akusala). According to the Buddha, his scepticism
is derived from both the fear of falling into error and the
ignorance of giving answer to any question put to him for discussion.
This extreme scepticism or sceptical doubt (vicikicchaa),
according to the Buddha, is a mental hindrance, fetter or defilement,
which will lead to non-development towards achievement of its
intellectual and spiritual goal or to non-productivity of mind
Buddhist scripture  shows its suspicion to the common claim
of these heretical teachers of being constantly "all-knowing,
all-seeing and all-embracing knowledge-and-vision."
The Buddhist argument leveled against such a claim starts with
a basic question that if they were so achieved why they had
loosen their way when entering a new place and why they did
not know how to escape from trouble while countering a fierce
animal like dog, elephant, horse or a bullock, etc. Moreover,
if they were really omniscient, they would have not asked people
their name, clan, the name of a village, a market town and the
way etc. They in fact did ask such questions. This shows that
their knowledge is evidently limited just like that of a average
or worldly man (puthujjana//p.rthagjana).
Greater Discourse to Saccaka (Mahaasaccakasutta)
mentions about the imperfection of the six heretics. Here in
this Sutta, Saccaka, the son of Jains, disproved their
perfection revealing that they shelved the question by asking
another, answered off the point and evinced anger and ill-will
and discontent when taken in hand speech by speech by him. He
admires the Buddha because he found him the contrary: "But
while the Gotama [the Buddha] was being spoken to thus so mockingly
and was being assailed by accusing ways of speech, his colour
was clear and countenance happy like that of a perfected one,
a fully Self-awakened one." This shows that the Buddha
is really of unique perfection, which is unparalleled by the
six heretical teachers.
the Sandaka Sutta  of the Majjhima Nikaaya,
the doctrines of the first four heretics are called amoralism
(abrahmacariya), for they among with the other two heretics
maintaining more or less the theory of no moral causation (akiriyavaada).
Their doctrines are altogether rejected as wrong theories (micchaadi.t.thi),
their thought as wrong thought (micchaasa"nkappa)
and their speech as wrong speech (micchaavaacaa). According
to the Buddha, the profounders of akiriyavaada are to
reject three ways of moral conducts (sucarita), namely,
moral bodily conduct (kaaya-sucarita), moral conduct
in speech (vacii-sucarita) and moral conduct in mentality
(mano-sucarita). This rejecting of moral action and its
consequences logically entails the attitude of being engaged
and enjoyed in threefold evil conduct (duccarita), which
is the basis of degeneration of human ethics. In other words,
those who fail to see the principle of moral causation (kiriyavaada)
will surely maintain that there is no action (karma),
non-causation of things (ahetuvaada), no the world beyond
(para loka). Such theorizers as well as their followers
would be blamed in this very life (idha loka)
and after passing away from this world they will go to a state
of suffering (duggati). As the case being the doctrines
of the six heretics were criticized by the Buddhists as lacking
of the principle of righteousness (kusala-dhamma). These
were rejected as unworthy to be followed and therefore one should
avoid to devotion and practice as soon as possible.
all Indian ethical theories preceding and contemporary with
him, the Buddha adopted and introduced a middle standpoint for
his epistemology and ethics known as the theory of dependent
With this new morally middle doctrine (majjhena dha"mma"m
deseti), the Buddha rejects all kinds of extremist theories,
such as permanent existence and nihilistic non-existence, strict
determinism, past-determination, theistic determination as well
as non-causation-and-non-conditionality, as follows:
The extremes of existence and non-existence or being and non-being.
The former is the theory admitting that everything exists (sabbaa
atthii ti), while the later advocating that nothing actually
exists (sabbaa natthii ti ).
The extremes of eternalism (sassatavaada) and annihilationalism
(ucchedavaada). If eternalism admits that one and
the same person both performs actions and experiences the results,
then annihilation admits that one performs actions, another
experiences the results.
The extremes of past-determination (sabbaa pubbekatahetuvaada)
or theistic determination (sabba issaranimmaanavaada)
and non-causation-and-non-conditionality (sabaa ahetu-apaccaya-vaada).
The first advocate that all human experience, suffering or happiness
are determined either by actions performed from the previous
lives, or by an almighty God, whereas the last admitting all
phenomena and human experience are happened without causes and
The extremes of attakaaravaada, the belief that pleasure
and pain brought about by ones self, and parakaaravaada,
the belief that pleasure and pain brought about
The extremes of Kaarakavedakaadi-ekattavaada and Kaarakavedakaadi-naanattavaada.
The former is the belief that the doer and the receiver of deed
are the same, whereas the latter is the belief that the doer
and the receiver of deed are different. If the Braahmanical
teachings of the Vedas and Upani.sads represent
a theistic theory of ethics, the Sramanic thinkers like Puura.na
Kassapa, Ajita Kesakambali, Pakudha Kaccaayana, Makkhali Gosaala,
Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta and Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta etc., represent
some form of amoralism (e.g. nihilistic materialism, non-causationalism
and determinism), the Buddhas teachings (dhamma)
are positive assertions of a rational-psychological moralism,
which is socially and universally acceptable.
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ChU. iii, 24, 2; viii. 1, 5; 7, 1; iii. 14, 2; KU.
i. 2, 13; ii. 3, 17; 2, 18; MuU. ii. 2, 7, 10-12;
iii. 1, 5; 1, 6-9; 2, 11-13.
Literally means "hearing" in Sanskrit. This is so-called
because it was not written down but transmitted orally from
the teacher to his followers.
D. I. 238ff. Cf. M. II. 170; MLS. II.
M. II. 164
M. II. 84.
M. II. 170; MLS. II. 360. These five grounds
also recur at S. II. 115, IV. 138; KS. II. 82;
IV. 88. Cf. A. I. 190, II. 191.
KU. i. 2. 21; ChU. vi. 1, 14.
ChU. vi. 2. 1; 'SvetU. iii, 9; BU. ii.
4, 14; iv, 4, 19; KU. ii. 1, 11.
KU. i. 2, 14-20; ii. 1, 5, 12-3; MaU. i, 1,
7; MuU. iii. 1, 7; BU. ii. 5, 9; iii, 8, 8;
iv. 4, 15-6.
KU. i. 2, 14; 'SvetU. vi. 9.
KU. i. 2, 18.
This unique law of dependent origination or causal uprising
(paticcasamuppaada) was discovered by the Buddha on
his attainment of perfect enlightenment. Ud. 1-2.
S. II. 27f, 64f, 95; KS. II. 23, 45, 66: imasmii
sati idaa hoti, imassupaada idam uppajjati; imasmii asati
idaa na hoti, imassa nirodhaa idaa nirujjhati. Vide also
M. III. 63; MLS. III. 107, and Ud. 2.
This view is examined at M. II. 214; MLS. III.
Cf. A. I. 173ff; GS. I. 157ff.
Dhaatu-dhammatthitataa = sbhaava-tthitataa, that
which, as cause, establishes elements as effects. Quoted
from GS. I. 264, note 3.
Dhamma-niyaamataa that which, as cause, invariably
fixes things in our minds, as effects. Cf. S.
II. 25; KS. II. 21, where a further term is added,
idappaccayata, the relation of this to that.
Quoted from GS. I. 264. n. 4.
The meaning of sankhaara can differ according to contexts.
In the context of the five aggregates of existence (khandha),
sankhaara tends to mean bad thoughts that a person
harbors, and so its sense is psychological; but in the context
of the three characteristics of existence (tilakkhana),
sankhaara tends to mean all phenomena or compounded
things, be they physical or psychological; in other words
the whole of the five aggregates of existence.
Also see in Dhp.: Sabbe sankhaara aniccati (277);
Sabbe sankhaara dukkhaati (278); Sabbe dhamma anattaati
MuU. ii. 2, 11; iii. 1, 1-2; 2, 1; KU. i. 2,
18; 3, 3-4, 9-10; ii. 2, 13; 'SvetU. i. 9-10, 12; iii.
19; ChU. iv. 15, 4; BU. iv. 4, 22; ii. 5, 15.
For detailed treatment of the Upanisadic aatman, see
for example Sinha (1999): 31-7.
S. III, p. 50.
S. III. 67; KS. III 59f. Also see M.
S. V. 430; KS. V. 365.
A. IV. 137; GS. IV. 92: Just as a mountain river,
winding here and there, swiftly flowing, taking all along
with it, never for a moment or for an instant or for a second
pauses, but rushes of, swirls along and sweeps forward; even
so, braahman, like a mountain river is the life of man, insignificant,
trifling, fraught with ill and trouble
For the born
there is no immortality.
A. I. 152; GS. I. 135: "Monks, there are
these three condition-marks of that which is conditioned.
What three? Its genesis is apparent, its passing away is apparent,
its changeability while it persists is apparent. These are
the three condition-marks
EB. III. 328b.
Sn. 600-611; M. II. 196ff.
M. II. 148ff; D. I. 80ff; III. 80ff.
Sn. p. 23. Reference is from EB. V. 116b.
D. III. 81-2; DB. III. 78-9.
Detailed account of these practices is repeatedly found at
D. I. 165ff; III. 6-7, 37ff; A. I. 294; II.
207; M. I. 77ff., 238ff., 342, 387, 524.
M. I. 240ff: This is considered as another extreme
of practice vs. self-indulgence (kaamasukhallikaanuyoga).
S. I. 38.
On Braama.nas sacrifices, see M. I. 343-44; S.
I. 75; A. IV. 41; D. I. 127, 141.
Tachibana (1986): 39.
Tachibana (1986): 40-1.
For example at S. I. 76; A. II. 42; IV. 151;
It. 21; Sn. 303 etc.
For meaning of these sacrifices, see KS. I. 102, n.
D. I. 144ff; DB. I. 182ff.
For their content, see DB. I. 174, nn. 3-4.
In Buddhism there are also thirteen ascetic practices (dhuta"nga).
These are not considered by the Buddha as the path leading
to liberation but rather an alternative preparation to the
path. For a full account see EB. II. 168. Cf. M.
III. 39-42; DhpA. I. 141; Vism. ch. ii.).
M. I. 387ff; D. III. 6-7.
D. III. 44-5.
S. IV. 338.
M. I. 388.
D. III. 232.
S. I. 38.
See, for instance, at D. I. 56ff; M. I. 517ff;
M. II. 2-4; S. I. 69ff. Sometimes only two heretics
are mentioned, for example, at A. IV. 47 only Puura.na
and Niga,n.tha are dealt with for comparison.
See, for example, at S. III. 211; A. III. 383.
For instance, at M. I. 513-524; S. III. 207,
For instance, at S. IV. 398: Ajata is confused with
other heretics; at A. I. 286: Ajata with Makkhali;
at A. III. 383: Makkhali with Pakudha and Puura.na.
For further evidence to support this, see E. Thomas (1997):
130f., Bhikkhu Bodhi (1989): 7 n.2; and KS. III. 17-
E.g. M. I. 407, 515-17; S. III. 208, 210.
For example, at M. I. 515ff, Ananda is said to have
analysed and then refuted the teachings of the heretics, whose
names are not mentioned.
D. I. 51-59.
Cp. Bhikkhu Bodhi (1989): 7.
Bhikkhu Bodhi (1989): 9.
On two kinds of Materialism, see Kalupahana (1975): 26-32;
Kalupahana (1994): 13-4.
D. I. 55.
D. I. 56.
D. I. 53.
M. I. 81-2.
A. I. 173.
Kalupahana (1975): 53.
For account on Mahaaviiras epistemology, see B. M. Barua
(1998): 400-4; Kalupahana (1994): 17-9.
SuutrakŁ taa"nga I. 1.2.4.
A. I. 173. For scrutiny of this point, see Kalupahana
M. II. 222.
S. V. 421.
D. I. 58.
EB. IV. s.v. doubt: 667a.
M. I. 519-20; MLS. II. 199. Cf. M. I.
92-3; A. I. 220.
Their claims of this attainment can be found at many palaces
in the Tripi.taka, see for instance, at A. I. 220-1;
A. IV. 428; M. I. 482, 519; M. II. 31,
M. I. 519-20; MLS. II. 199.
M. I. 250-1; MLS. I. 305.
Including the Jaina leader Niga.n.t.tha Naathaputta.
Tr. by Horner, MLS. I. 305.
M. I. 513.
A. I. 33 says "When doctrine and discipline are
wrongly expounded he who strives energetically live a miserable
lives." Tr. by F. L. Woodward, GS. I. 30.
M. I. 519. Apart from the criticism levelled against
the six heretics, this Sutta also rejects the traditionalist
and the rationalist. M. I. 520f.
S. II. 17; KS. II. 13. Also see in S. III.
134f; KS . III. 114; and S. II. 76; KS. II.
S. II. 20; KS. II. 16.
A. I. 173.
S. II. 22f; KS. II. 18f.
S. II. 75; KS. II. 52.