Selflessness:
Toward a Buddhist Vision of Social Justice
By Sungtaek Cho
Program in Korean Studies
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Abstract
The difficulty
of developing a theoretical framework for Buddhism in engagement
with contemporary social issues is rooted in the very nature
of Buddhism as an ontological discourse aiming at individual
salvation through inner transformation. It is my contention,
however, that the concept of selflessness can become the
basis of a Buddhist theory of social justice without endangering
Buddhism s primary focus on individual salvation. In this
article, I show how the key concept of selflessness can provide
a viable ground for Buddhist social justice by comparing it
with one of the most influential contemporary Western theories
of social justice, that of the American philosopher John Rawls.
Drawing on the bodhisattva ideal and the Buddhist concepts
of sickness and cure, I then demonstrate how selflessness
can serve as a link that allows Buddhists to be socially engaged
even while pursuing the goal of individual salvation.
Introduction
The religious
goal of Buddhism is the attainment of inner peace through
the experience of enlightenment; this is often described as
liberation or nirvana. The latter term, nirvana,
which was used more commonly by the earlier Theravada Buddhists,
is often translated as a state of being extinguished or
blown out. It refers to the elimination of various mental
obstacles, often called defilements, which are essentially
derived from the three poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance.
Liberation, on the other hand, a term preferred by the later
Mahayahna Buddhists, has a slightly broader perspective, as
it refers not to the elimination of certain states of mind,
but rather to the attainment of wisdom, which is interpreted
as freedom both from the bondage of life and death, samsra,
as well as from social and historical bondage.
Because
of its emphasis on individual salvation, Buddhism is often
seen as a quietist religion that fails to consider societal
problems. This is, of course, a gross exaggeration. Mahyna
Buddhism s bodhisattva ideal, Pure Land doctrine,
and Maitreyanism, which often appeared in China in times of
political instability, both reach past the individual to relate
Buddhist soteriology to society as a whole. Nevertheless,
it is true that, even today, Buddhist thought rarely, if ever,
addresses the topic of social justice in the modern sense,
that is, in terms of such things as human rights, the fair
distribution of resources, the impartial rule of law, and
political freedom. As seen in Mahyna texts such as The
Teachings of Vimalak+rti (Vimalak+rti-nirde[a-sktra),
the oft-mentioned phrase, When one s mind becomes purified,
society will also be purified, (1)
tells us that Buddhism has a rather naive notion concerning
social issues: the communal good can be realized through the
promotion of individual morality.(2)
Of course,
Buddhism is hardly alone in this regard. Almost all of the
ancient philosophies and religions paid scant attention to
issues of social justice in the modern sense. Even Catholicism,
which has addressed social issues from early times, did not
concern itself with questions of social justice or use the
term in official documents until the latter part of the nineteenth
century. Indeed, it is only from the eighteenth century that
social justice emerged as an important issue in political
thought and social philosophy in the West. The last three
centuries have thus seen the maturation of such key concepts
as citizenship, political equality, and the fair distribution
of economic resources.
However,
the process of modernization that drove the development of
social philosophy in the West paradoxically retarded it in
the East. Belatedly experiencing modernization as Westernization
initiated by military and economic contact with Western
colonial powers, Eastern intellectuals lost confidence in
their native traditions, coming to see them as relics of the
past without relevance to contemporary problems. As a result,
indigenous philosophies and religions, such as Buddhism, were
neglected in favor of the study of Western thought.
This process
has only recently begun to reverse itself. As the East becomes
increasingly aware of the value of its own cultural identity,
a new strain of thought is emerging, interested not only in
relating traditional to modern concerns, but also in reevaluating
tradition in search of solutions to the problems of contemporary
society. The so-called Engaged Buddhism, which attempts
to address such issues as the environment, gender inequality
and poverty, is one of the more distinctive contemporary efforts
in this area. But it is too diverse to be considered a single
movement, and still too new to have developed a theoretical
framework for Buddhism s engagement with contemporary social
issues.
The difficulty
of developing such a framework is rooted not only in decades
of intellectual stagnation, but more fundamentally, in the
very nature of Buddhism as an ontological discourse aiming
at individual salvation through inner transformation. Of course,
this problem is not peculiar to Buddhism; all religions must
face the dilemma of balancing the demands of individual salvation
and social engagement. For this reason, I would like to present
some tentative suggestions on how the concept of selflessness,
a core doctrine of Buddhism, can be used to form the basis
of a Buddhist theory of social justice without endangering
Buddhism s primary focus on individual salvation. I will
begin by demonstrating how selflessness can provide a viable
ground for Buddhist social justice by comparing it with one
of the most influential contemporary Western theories of social
justice, that of the American philosopher John Rawls; in doing
so I will suggest that Buddhism contains within itself the
latent potential for a theory of social justice suitable to
the needs of contemporary society. I will then demonstrate
how the concept of selflessness can serve as a link that allows
Buddhists to be socially engaged even while pursuing the goal
of individual salvation.
Selflessness
and Social Justice
Does Buddhism
contain the latent potential for a theory of social justice
suitable to the needs of contemporary society? It is interesting
to consider this question in light of the work of the American
philosopher John Rawls, in large part because his extremely
influential book, A Theory of Justice, seems to represent
the apex of everything that Buddhism is not. Though designed
to achieve social justice, Rawls s theory is explicitly amoral,
in that it assumes no particular moral inclination in the
individual, and it is likewise unconcerned with deriving an
overarching transcendental or religious authority to enforce
its notion of the social good. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate
how social justice can be built upon individual self-interest,
and therefore focuses less on individual behavior and more
on the social institutions regulating that behavior. In its
explanatory power and persuasiveness, it is a triumph of Western
rationality.
It is
my belief, however, that Rawls s brand of rational social
engineering offers Buddhism an important chance to clarify
its own underdeveloped relationship to the question of social
justice. But in order to do this, we must first discuss Rawls
s theory in somewhat more detail.
In general,
Western theories of social justice begin with the intention
to legitimize and ensure the individual s freedom to pursue
his own interests. Such a notion of homo economicus
is not merely a product of the economical and social theories
that were derived from and support capitalist society, but
also has deep roots in the Western tradition prior to capitalism.
The individual and society that serve as the background for
Rawls s theory of social justice represent the individual
in the pursuit of self-interest, and the society that consists
of such individuals. For Rawls, justice is not a virtue handed
down to human beings a priori, but rather a general
condition that is needed to maintain the society. According
to Rawls, although a society is a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage, it is typically marked by a conflict as
well as an identity of interests (Rawls 1971, 126). Thus,
in order to settle the conflicts that exist among members
of a society, principles are needed for choosing among the
various social arrangements which determine this division
of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper
distributive shares (Rawls 1971, 126).
However,
Rawls recognizes that the fairness of these principles depends
on the fairness of the process by which these principles can
be induced and agreed upon. In order to warrant the fairness
of this process, Rawls postulates a so-called original position
for those charged with inducing the principles, meaning
that his ideal decision-makers are not constrained by arbitrary
contingencies or the relative balance of social forces (Rawls
1971, 120). To ensure this lack of constraint, Rawls further
posits what he calls the veil of ignorance, meaning that
his decision-makers have no knowledge of their own place in
the society they are designing. They could be well or poorly
educated, talented or dull equipped to compete, or possibly
not. Rawls believes that this uncertainty as to their own
competitive potential in the social arena would naturally
lead his hypothetical decision-makers to arrive at disinterested
rules of social justice that would protect the less competitive
members of society and ensure a fair distribution of resources
to all. To do so would be in their own self-interest. Because
of the veil of ignorance, the strongest motive for fairness
is the possibility that you could be anyone in the community.
In terms
of its methodology, Rawls s theory of social justice is based
on ethical constructivism: drawing on the Western philosophical
tradition, particularly Kant, he develops a set of ethical
assumptions while staying within the scope of a strict empiricism.
Nevertheless, I believe that Rawls s work offers some intriguing
hints as to how to construct a theoretical framework for a
Buddhist theory of social justice. It is, of course, not that
the Buddhist point of view agrees with Rawls s theory, but
that the Western philosopher s work offers us a provocative
way to relate the timeless, ontological concerns of Buddhism
to the phenomenal world of social interactions. That is to
say, it helps clarify the relation in Buddhism between the
focus on self-nature and personal enlightenment an ontological
concern and the need to think about the daily behavior of
the Buddhist practitioner in society a phenomenal concern.
On first
glance, the amoral rationalism on which Rawls bases his theory
of social justice might seem like the farthest thing possible
from Buddhism; but further thought shows some surprising connections.
The Buddhist theory of selflessness, when considered in terms
of the individual and his/her place in the community, really
becomes something of great social power: an extended interpretation
of selfhood. That is, in Buddhism, the individual self is
redefined to include all other selves through the theory of
mutual interpenetration. And this brings us to an interesting
intersection with Rawls; for if the hypothetical veil of
ignorance and the possibility that I can be anybody in
the community is the starting point for his conception of
fairness, Buddhism offers a startling parallel in the concept
of selflessness namely, the idea that I am everybody
in the community.
It is
my belief that the Buddhist theory of selflessness can thus
serve as a launching point for a theory of a rational social
justice as persuasive as the one that Rawls suggests. But
for this to be achieved, Buddhism will have to learn how to
move away from the traditional ontological discourse of the
sktras and classical Buddhist doctrines focusing
on self-transformation and the individual s search for personal
enlightenment and into the phenomenal discourse of the social
realm meaning politics, economics, and law. In that sense,
the theory of selflessness, the idea that I am everyone in
the community, can become a theoretical doorway through which
the Buddhist thinker passes from the ontological to the phenomenal
realm of discourse.
Of course,
the differences between Rawls s model of social justice and
whatever Buddhist model is eventually developed will be significant.
Almost certainly, the Buddhist model will put less emphasis
on social institutions and more on personal behavior, most
especially on such personal qualities as compassion and benevolence
qualities that are seen as contributing to the search for
enlightenment. Indeed, this fact points to a final, inevitable
divergence between Rawls s brand of rationalistic social
engineering and Buddhism. For Rawls, the achievement of social
justice is an end in itself, and his philosophical concerns
stop there. Once social justice has been achieved, there is
nothing more to talk about. Obviously, this cannot be the
case for Buddhism, focused as it is on the ultimate concern
of personal enlightenment. For Buddhism, the concern with
social justice must ultimately lead back to the search for
enlightenment. The theory of selflessness may serve as a theoretical
doorway from the ontological discourse to the phenomenal,
but it must work as both entrance and exit. Involvement with
the phenomenal realm of social justice must lead Buddhism
back to the ontological discourse and the search for enlightenment.
The
Selflessness of the Bodhisattva: Curing Oneself By
Curing Others
As mentioned
earlier, I believe that the concept of selflessness can be
used to link the apparently conflicting goals of social justice
and individual enlightenment. But to show how, we will have
to take a step back and discuss the Buddhist ideas of suffering,
the cure of suffering, and the bodhisattva ideal; only
then will it become clear how social justice and the search
for individual enlightenment can actually serve to reinforce
one another.
In Buddhism,
the process of spiritual growth is often compared to the healing
of sickness. The First Noble Truth states that life is suffering,
but in Buddhism s view, suffering can be cured if the proper
remedy is applied. Suffering stems from our subconscious desires,
which are often referred to as thirst, thus indicating
their blind and vehement driving force. Because of the blind
nature of desire in general, this thirst, which causes
the root sickness of human suffering, is often equated with
ignorance. All other diseases are merely symptoms of this
fundamental ignorance. The main symptom is the attachment
to external objects and to something inside oneself, one s
so-called self.
Based
on this diagnosis, the Buddha suggested the availability of
a remedy. He believed that enlightenment, or happiness as
opposed to suffering, is inherent in the individual, which
means that happiness may be achieved by curing the root sickness
within ourselves.
As stated
at the outset of this paper, Buddhism s emphasis on self-healing
the search for enlightenment is the primary reason why it
did not develop a mature social philosophy. And yet, though
the Buddha never intended to create a political ideology,
he certainly never ignored other people. Having taught his
disciples and helped them become enlightened, he then urged
them to preach to others: Walk, monks, on tour for the blessing
of many people, for the happiness of many people out of compassion
for the world, for the welfare, the blessing, the happiness
of devas and human beings. Let not two of you go by
the same way. (3)
Early
Buddhists understood this passage to mean that the Buddha
asked his disciples to work for others, but it was also interpreted
as meaning that in order to help others one must first become
enlightened and therefore healed a point made explicitly
in a Buddhist dictum: [O]ne who is sick cannot cure others.
As a result, Buddhists, occupied with the work of self-healing,
became relatively passive in the social arena.
Yet, as
stated earlier, it would be a gross oversimplification to
claim that Buddhism is oblivious to the interpersonal dimension
of human experience. The original belief that one who is sick
cannot cure others came to be radically transformed by the
bodhisattva ideal, which appeared in the later phase
of Buddhism known as Mahyna Buddhism. This new religious
figure, the bodhisattva, embodied the new socio-religious
atmosphere at the time when Mahyna Buddhism began to appear
in India.
Who
Cures?
A bodhisattva,
by definition, is a Buddha candidate who is often referred
to in early Buddhist texts as representing the previous lives
of the Buddha. In his many rebirths, the bodhisattva
appeared in various kinds of existences, as an animal or a
human being, and as a noble or commoner. The exemplary life
stories of the bodhisattvas are compiled in the Jtaka.
Mahyna Buddhists, however, feel that the stories of the
previous lives of the Buddha are not merely a record of the
past, but are, rather, exemplary patterns to follow in the
present. Those who emulate the heroic acts of the Buddha in
his past lives can also become bodhisattvas.
For our
purposes here, the crucial importance of the bodhisattva
ideal in Mahyna Buddhism is that the bodhisattva
cures himself by curing others. We find the following passage
in the Vajradhvaja-sktra:
A Bodhisattva
resolves: I take upon myself the burden of all suffering,
I am resolved to do so, I will endure it & And why?
At all costs I must bear the burdens of all beings &
The whole world of living beings I must rescue, from the
terrors of birth, of old age, of sickness, of death and
rebirth. (Conze et. al. trans. 1964, 131)
This is
not simply compassion toward others in need. For the bodhisattva,
the essence of the non-self doctrine, which has been repeatedly
emphasized since the beginning of Buddhism, is that there
is in fact no difference between himself and others. Non-self
in Buddhism is not merely the denial of a substantial self,
comparable to the soul in the Western tradition; it also
implies a nondualistic view of me and others, and asserts
the extension of one s own existence beyond the boundary
of the self, to encompass that of others. Others, for the
bodhisattva, are nothing more than the extension of
his own existence. He embraces all others as we, which
includes not just me and you, but also them.
The concept
of selflessness thus opens the avenue to social awareness
and the necessity of engagement. Vimalak+rti, a typical Mahyna
bodhisattva figure, identifies the sickness of all
living beings with his own, stating, I am sick because all
sentient beings are sick; when the sicknesses of all sentient
beings have been cured, mine also will be cured. (4)
For this reason, he postpones his own enlightenment and chooses
to be born again and again until everyone else attains salvation.
The spiritual value of this choice lies in its active involvement
in society and in the notion that society is an extension
of one s own existence. Indeed, Vimalak+rti instructs bodhisattvas
to convert the experience of sickness into something positive,
something that generates wholesome, striving energy:
Because
of his own illness, he should take pity on all others who
are sick. He should know of the suffering of countless aeons
of past lives, and because of this he should think of the
welfare of all beings. He should be mindful of the pure
life. Instead of generating grief and vexation, he should
constantly give rise to striving energy. He should become
a king of healing and cure all ills.(5)
Here we
see that the experience of suffering becomes transformed into
the potentiality of curing others: without the experience
of sickness one cannot cure another. At this point Raoul Birnbaum
brilliantly states:
[F]or
the Bodhisattvas, & experience of illness will not be
a hampering factor but rather a catalyst, the ultimate function
of which is to stimulate renewed and increased dedication
to spiritual work. Instead of causing the Bodhisattva to
seek release from his own bodily pains by entering into
the bliss of nirvana, illness for him should be a
great leveler, reminding him of the essential brotherhood
of man inherent in the shared suffering of disease. Conscious
of his link to all beings, he should increase his resolve
to come to their aid and succor. (Birnbaum 1979, 14)
Indeed,
it seems as if the true bodhisattva actually welcomes
or seeks the experience of sickness. Thus we read in the Vajradhvaja-sktra:
To the
limit of my endurance I will experience in all the states
of woe, found in any world system, all the abodes of suffering
& I am resolved to abide in each single state of woe
for numberless aeons; and so I will help all beings to freedom,
in all the states of woe that may be found. (Conze et al.
trans. 1964, 131)
Why does
the bodhisattva choose to adopt the suffering of others?
How does this enable him to help them and thus to lead them,
and ultimately himself as well, to enlightenment? It is because
only by fully embracing the experience of others, which naturally
entails experiencing their sickness and suffering, can he
fully realize himself as identical to them. The experience
of absorbing himself into their sickness, and of thus realizing
his essential identification with them, is the only means
by which the bodhisattva may develop wisdom and compassion,
qualities that he needs in order to show others the cause
of their sickness. Similarly, he may use these same qualities
of wisdom and compassion in order to discover why he himself
also suffers.
Obviously,
the above discussion is anchored on the level of soteriology,
not social philosophy. The bodhisattva seeks to cure
himself of suffering by gaining enlightenment, but because
of his profound understanding of the doctrine of selflessness,
he realizes that to do so he must first help cure all other
sentient beings. This then entails an active engagement with
their suffering, and furthermore, a willingness to
find personal inspiration in the struggle against suffering
in general.
Yet though
the concern here is undoubtedly soteriological, the basis
of a nascent theory of social justice is also clearly evident.
All that we need do is move from the ontological or soteriological
level down to the phenomenal or social level. Once we manage
this move, the doctrine of selflessness provides the underpinnings
we need, in that it posits the mutual interdependency of all
members of society and the shared nature of all types of suffering:
spiritual, physical, emotional, and economic. To put it another
way: just as Rawls s theoretical founders, in order to assure
the fairness of their laws, are forced to imagine themselves
as being potentially anyone in society, the doctrine
of selflessness requires that Buddhists view themselves as
being in fact everyone in society. The social implications
of this viewpoint are of course powerful: her poverty
becomes my poverty; his tragedy, my tragedy.
And when combined with the model of active engagement offered
by the bodhisattva ideal, in which personal health
is achieved by helping others, we suddenly find ourselves
with a solid rationale for social action.
What would
a detailed theory of Buddhist social justice consist of? What
would a just society look like from the Buddhist point of
view? These are obviously extremely complex questions, far
beyond the scope of this article. My goal here has been to
show that these questions can be asked from a Buddhist point
of view indeed, that they urgently need to be posed and
that an attempt at an answer, however tentative, is in fact
long overdue.
Notes
- T
475 Wei mo ch i so shuo ching, 538c. In my translation,
I rendered the term fo t u (buddhakcetra),
or buddha-field, as society, which, I believe, does not
deviate much from the original meaning, and gives a better
sense of the original word in the context of this discussion.
Return to text
- We
might call this perfectionism, and Confucius s notion
of justice also belongs to this category. A perfectionist
notion of justice has the potential danger of restricting
personal freedoms and justifying social hierarchy. It seems
to me that perfectionism is one of the characteristics of
the classical notion of justice, both in the East and West.
Agreeing with Plato, Brahmanical India viewed the purpose
of the caste system as the realization of proper social
justice. One extreme case of the perfectionist notion of
social justice can be seen in the Bhagavad G+t,
a classic of Brahmanical India. In the midst of battle,
Arjuna agonizes over whether he must kill his brother, even
though it is for the sake of justice; the incarnation of
Krishna (K[cG.a) tells him that his duty as a member
of the Kshatriya (Kcatriya) caste should come before individual
ethics. It would be worthwhile to note that the Sanskrit
word Dharma means both justice as righteousness
and duty. Return to text
- I.
B. Horner, trans., The Book of the Discipline, vol.
IV, 28 (with slight modifications). Return
to text
- T
475 Wei mo ch i so shuo ching, 544b. Return
to text
- T
475 Wei mo ch i so shuo ching, 544c. Return
to text
References
Primary
Source
T 475
Wei mo ch i so shuo ching, compiled in the TaishM
shinshk daizMkyM, vol. 14, pp. 537 557.
Secondary
Sources
Birnbaum,
Raoul. 1979. The Healing Buddha. Boston: Shambala.
Conze,
Edward, et al., ed. 1964. Buddhist Texts Through the Ages.
New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks.
Horner,
I. B. 1966. The Book of the Discipline. Vol. IV. Sacred
Books of the Buddhist, vol. 30, London: Pali Text society.
Rawls,
John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
http://jbe.la.psu.edu/index.html
Volume 7, 2000
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